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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 970398-CA

:

JOHN D. HAWKINS,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Homer
F. Wilkinson presiding.1

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Could reasonable minds conclude that neither an abandoned

"lease" nor demands that defendant remove his property from the leased
shop authorized defendant to kick in the door and enter the premises
at 4 a.m.?
"In a jury trial in a criminal proceeding, [this Court will]
review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
1

Defendant was^ also convicted of theft, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R.
130-31, 167-68).

therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." State
v. Ortiz. 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted),
cert, denied,795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

It will "reverse a jury

conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Id.
2.

Could reasonable minds infer defendant' s intent to commit

theft from record facts, including that he entered the premises at
4 a.m., removed others' property, and lied about it to police?
See standard of review for issue no. 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This case involves the following statutes, which are reproduced
in addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3) (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Amended Information as follows:
Count I

Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202;

Count II

Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404.

(R. 120-21) . At the conclusion of a two-day trial, the jury found
defendant guilty of burglary and class A misdemeanor theft, a lesser
included offense of count II of the Information (R. 130-31, 167-68) .
i

2

Defendant was sentenced to statutory terms and fines, but his
sentences were stayed and defendant was placed on 36-month probation
(R. 196-97).

Defendant timely appealed (R. 293).
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
The Markhams' two

units

Gloria Markham and her brother, Tim Markham, rented two 30 X
30 shop units, no. 98 and no. 99, in a light industrial complex of
100 such units in Murray City (R. 300: 64, 195) .3 Each unit had
an roll-up, overhead door and an "outside door" (R. 300: 101). Units
98 and 99 were connected by an interior door (R. 300: 148).
Defendant's

sublease:

"You pay,

you

stay"

In the summer of 1995, Tim Markham let defendant, who was the
Markhams' first cousin once removed (see R. 300: 63, 134), do some
auto body work and "fiddling around" in the units (R. 300: 136-37,
208).

Defendant used the units from time to time thereafter; he

sometimes spent the night there (R. 300: 138; R. 301: 34). Tim
Markham, also in the auto body business, let defendant use his tools
(R. 300: 65, 171). Defendant had no tools that were of any use to
Markham (R. 300: 172).

2

Except as noted, facts are stated in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989).
3

"R. 300: 64" refers to page 64 of the transcript that is
labeled "R. 300."
3

Tim Markham subleased unit 98 to defendant (R. 300: 67, 140);
his arrangement with subtenants, including defendant, was month-tomonth: "you pay and you stay.

If you don't, you go" (R. 300: 136,

169; R. 301: 198) . Generally, defendant's property was in unit 98,
Tim Markham's in unit 99 (R. 300: 92, 140).
Defendant was supposed to pay $340 per month, which was the
rental Tim Markham was paying on each unit (R. 300: 169) . Defendant
made a couple of payments, including one to the unit manager in
November 1995 (R. 300: 69, 170, 199; Defendant's exhibit 14).4
Because some rollers were missing from the overhead door of
unit 98, Tim Markham used vise grips to lock the door from the inside
(R. 300: 72, 147-48; R. 301: 199). If defendant came to use the
unit and forgot his key, he would sometimes roll under this door
(R. 300: 138) .
Defendant

"evicted himself

by not

showing"

However, after October 1995 defendant "just disappeared for
two or three months and never Ccime back for anything" (R. 300: 108,
158, 170, 205; R. 301: 10). At this time, defendant went to work
as a handyman, security person, and bartending intern at the ThreeAlarm Saloon, owned by Jack Carlton (R. 301: 87-88, 110).

4

Apparently, defendant's employer and partner, Jack
Carlton, furnished the rent money so that defendant could
complete work on Carlton's wife's car and do other jobs (R. 301:
82-83).
4

Defendant paid no rent for the months of December 1995 or January
1996 (R. 300: 158, 199-20; R. 301: 108, 198). The Markhams never
formally evicted him; according to Tim Markham, "he evicted himself
by not showing" (R. 300: 170). "[B]ecause [defendant] was gone,"
Tim Markham changed the locks (R. 300: 139, 171).5

This was in

keeping with his policy of w[n]o pay, no stay" (R. 300: 171).
Defendant did not enter the units after the end of October until
the night of the crime, 14 January 1996 (R. 300: 149, R. 301: 52-53) .
During this period, the Markhams, Jim Severns, and the manager
of the units called defendant and his employer/partner Jack Carlton
"all the time to tell them to come and get their stuff, [but] they
never did" (R. 300: 108-09, 141-42; R. 301: 19-20).

In fact,

defendant "was called three or four or ten or twenty times" (R. 300:
141).

Tim Markham told him to "Come and get your stuff," except

that he did not use the word "stuff" (R. 300: 142).

5

Tim Markham was unable to change one lock. Jim Severns
had given defendant a padlock, which he apparently placed on the
outside door of unit 98 (R. 300: 139-40; R. 301: 163-64).
Severns kept the other key (R. 301: 164). Despite this fact, Tim
Markham was of the belief that "there was no way [defendant]
could get in" (R. 300: 139), perhaps because of the "motorcycle
laying in front of the door" (R. 301: 170).
Defendant's statement that "the state objected when Mr.
Hawkins, while testifying, produced the key to access the units,"
Br. Aplt. at 21, is incomplete. The State objected on the ground
that "without the padlock itself . . . [i]t doesn't mean
anything" (R. 301: 169). The court sustained the objection
(id.). Defense counsel neither contested the State's objection
nor attempted to establish that the key defendant drew out of his
pocket fit the padlock.
5

Tim Markham subleases

unit

98 to a new

subtenant

After defendant abandoned unit 98, Markham rented it to a
replacement subtenant (R. 300: 144, 184) . His arrangement with this
new subtenant, as with defendant, was "You pay, you stay; you don't,
you go" (R. 300: 144).
Jim Severns

sees

defendant

at the shop around

4 a.m.

Jim Severns was staying in his unit, no, 84, on the night of
Saturday, 13 January 1996 (R. 301: 8, 11). Hearing two cars, he
walked out of his unit and saw two cars parked near the end of the
row; the drivers were talking to each other (R. 301: 11) . One car
drove off, but the other pulled up and stopped at Severns' shop;
it was defendant (R. 301: 11).
Severns was shocked to see defendant because he had not seen
defendant around the units for a long time (R. 301: 12, 42) .
Defendant "seemed nervous" and asked Severns what he was doing there
(R. 301: 12, 52). This question also struck Severns as unusual,
since defendant knew that Severns was typically present at the units
(R. 301: 12, 52).
When asked the same question in return, defendant said he was
looking for his dog (R. 301: 12). His Dalmatian then came running
up and got into defendant's car, and defendant left (R. 301: 12-13) .
On his way out, defendant stopped and talked to the driver of the
other car again, after which both cars left (R. 301: 22).

6

At about 4:12 a.m., defendant called Severns from a pay phone
(R. 301: 13-14).

He said that he had driven by Severns' shop and

that the door was open and a station wagon was parked out front (R.
301: 14) . A few minutes later defendant called again (R. 301: 14) .
He wanted Severns to "go down and get all of his tools and everything
he had down there the next day" (R. 301: 14) . Severns told him to
come down the next day and he would help him get them (R. 301: 14) .6
Severns woke up at about 6:30 a.m. and walked down the row of
units (R. 301: 15) . Noticing the bottom of unit 98's door was kicked
in, Severns looked around the unit, then went to Tim Markham's house
and got Tim, who in turn called Gloria (R. 301: 15-16).
"I went in and did what I had to do"
Inspection of unit 98 revealed that the vise grips had been
popped off and the bottom of the door damaged, having been bent or
"kicked in" (R. 300: 72, 145, 148).
Defendant had taken various items, including a welder, a spray
gun, paint guns, and a microwave (R. 300: 73). In fact, except for
his dragster and a compressor that was too heavy to carry, all of
defendant's things were gone, along with Markham's tools (R. 300:
128-29, 146-50, 184; R. 301: 17, 40-41; State's exhibits 3, 4).
Defendant loaded a garbage can with the new subtenant' s power tools,

6

The day before and earlier that night defendant had called
police, claiming a dispute with his "partner" over tools in
Markham's units; they advised him the matter was a civil dispute
(Defendant's exhibit 15 & 16).
7

but the bottom fell out of it before he could remove it from the
unit (R. 300: 73, 151; R. 301: 16-17).

The stolen tools were

basically what one would need to be in the auto-body business (R.
300: 152) .
Defendant left some valuable items—including a VCR, a television,
a Telecaster guitar and two guitar amplifiers—but took other things
that had value only to him, such as dragster brakes and glass cabinet.
doors (R. 300: 124-26, 157).
Defendant admitted at trial that he entered both units on the
night of 13-14 January 1996 and "did what I had to do" (R. 301: 16971, 198) .7 At that time, defendant did not have the permission of
either Gloria or Tim Markham to be in unit 98 or 99 or to remove
any tools (R. 300: 117, 149, 158).
"It was pretty

obvious

who was

there"

Because it was "pretty obvious" who had entered the units, Tim
Markham called defendant at about 8:00 a.m. on the morning of 14
January 1996 (R. 300: 159). Markham said, "Hawk, this is me . .
. Just bring the tools back and come and get your shit" (R. 300:
159) .8 Defendant responded, "I'm not awake yet, man; call me later"

7

Defendant never admitted taking the property. When asked
on direct, "[D]id you take anything with you when you exited?"
defendant evaded: "Just — I was looking for my dog. That's it"
(R. 301: 172).
8

By "shit," Tim Markham was referring to Jack Carlton's
trucks, two Hondas, a dragster trailer, and "all the junk that
[defendant] left sitting in front of the shop" (R. 300: 185).
8

(R. 300: 159) . When Markham called a second time, defendant stated,
"It wasn't me, man.

I didn't do it" (R. 300: 160).

Gloria Markham called defendant's employer and partner, Jack
Carlton, about the stolen tools (R. 300: 73-74).

Carlton stated,

"Yes, we know about this, and we might know where they are, and there
was a family member that had hocked them" (R. 300: 78, 97). When
she said, "Well, John's a family cousin. What are you telling me?"
He responded, "I don't know. I'm going to have to check things out"
(R. 300: 98).
After continued wrangling with defendant, Carlton, and their
lawyer left her feeling that "[n]obody wants to work things out,"
Gloria Markham called the police (R. 300: 74, 77, 93).9

Defendant

lies

to

police

In the course of investing this crime, Detective Deven Higgins
called defendant and told him that Tim and Gloria Markham were
accusing him of the crime; defendant denied any involvement (R. 300:

9

Gloria Markham wrote Carlton and defendant letters in a
continuing attempt to get them to remove their vehicles from the
units (R. 300: 74, 78; Defendant's exhibit 6; State's exhibit 8).
Eventually defendant's lawyer called her about the cars (R. 300:
74-75). She told him, "We just want them out of there. We want
our stuff back and want their stuff out of here" (R. 300: 75).
Carlton offered to pay Gloria about a third of the storage fees
she was claiming; she rejected this offer because she "wanted the
tools back" (R. 300: 77). Defendant and Carlton then sued her
(R. 300: 77). A week and a half later, the dragster was stolen
out of unit 98 (R. 300: 84,86; see also 230-31). Carlton's other
cars were eventually towed away (R. 300: 165, 215).
9

218-19, 221) . Detective Higgins then told defendant that a witness
(Jim Severns) had seen him at the units on the night in question;
defendant "denied he was seen" by Severns, claiming, "They're all
liars, and that wasn't me" (R. 300: 222; State's exhibit 19 second
page 1; see also R. 301: 206, 209-10).
Defendant later admitted to Detective Higgins that he did go
into the unit, but claimed that he did not take anything (R. 300:
222, State's exhibit 19 [last page]). At trial he admitted talking
to Severns there that night (R. 301: 196).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

"License and privilege" to enter.

Although defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he fails to marshal the
facts supporting the jury's verdict as required by settled appellate
principles. His claim is therefore not properly before this Court.
In any event, reasonable jurors could have concluded at trial
that defendant's "lease" did not grant him "license and privilege"
to break into units 98 and 99 at 4 a.m. and remove his and others'
property. It was a month-to-month, oral lease whose one term was,
"you pay and you stay.

If you don't, you go" (R. 300: 136, 169;

R. 301: 198). Defendant did not pay, and does not claim to have
paid, for the months of December 1995 or January 1996. Accordingly,
he had no right to enter the units in January 1996.
Likewise, reasonable jurors could have concluded at trial that
the Markhams' demands that defendant retrieve his and Jack Carlton's
10

vehicles .

r^+- authorize

a.m. and remove his and others' propert*

Based on the evidence,

jurors could reas_

* i-"J

understood to have intended for defendant

m r i n g business
luoervision.

Intent to commit the J (
i

i

in challenging the jury's finding

| ""

to marshal the supporting

facts.
easonable jurors could infer defendant's criminal
intent from the facts, including the following: deieiiiddti'i!

Ilui'i i I l »• 11

enterinq *:he shops on the night i n question; defendant entered the
shops -,• approximate] 1 , 1 '1 i i

I'1, I 11 i« M i in i l

I i

iipfpnd^nt-

removed property owned by Tim Markham as well as his own; and when
conli- ill ..• I I y | I i

lefer. I n.1

I 1*1 I i,l "i1 witerinq the shops.

ARGUMENT
Introduction
Defendant's claims on appeal challenge the sufficiency ui
€

h

<*

" L<AJL aiid are therefore controlled by the following

general principles.
Sufficiency challenges.

"In challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence, defendant caxxxeb
875 P.2d 604,
verdict

in . i ,' i inn mi,

o t a t e u. L i n i u a .

(Utah App. 1994) . This Court will reverse a jury
PVi elenee

"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable

minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Ortiz,

782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted), cert, denied,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
In making this determination, this Court will "review the evidence
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict."

Id.

Defendant's burden to marshal. Consequently, a defendant must
"marshal all evidence supporting the jury's verdict and must then
show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."
Pilling, 875 P.2d at 607-08 (Quoting State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,
472 (Utah App. 1991) (in turn Quoting State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,
1207 (Utah App. 1991))).
"The marshaling process is not unlike becoming th.e devil's
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position." West Valley City
v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
He or she must then present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence."

12

Id.

A defendant does n o t satisfy "this heavy b u r d e n , " i^., if h e
"onli • sites 1:1 le evidence favorable

™ s a n d reargues t h e

evidence as if at t r i a l . " Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 149 (Utah
t Cert.

denied,

is inappropriate o n appeal

Id.

i

?

" ; •: inappropriate ror an appellate court c-. entertain tne merits

ui m e challenge.

O/J r.^u au c>08.
POINT I

REASONABLE MINDS COULD CONCLUDE THAT NEITHER AN ABANDONED
MONTH-TO-MONTH "LEASE" NOR THE MARKHAMS' DEMANDS THAT
DEFENDANT REMOVE HIS PROPERTY FROM THEIR PREMISES AUTHORIZED
DEFENDANT TO KICK IN THE DOOR AND ENTER THE SHOPS AT 4 A.M.
Defendant claims that

sublease with Tim Markham "vested
'

turtner claims that M a r k h a m ratified defendant's "repeated, open
::i ::: m i s • 21: it. t r::! • s •, 3 :i i 1 1 • ::: • t: h • s " 11 i :i t:
was authorized, h e a r g u e s , m e juiy could no I: 1 lave
ux. burglary.

Jd

a „. t 11 9

COnvicted

Be caus e h I s

him

Id, ?+• 1 ^-"M

VI

A person xs ^ I - . L ; ~ I ourgiar^ -i he enters or remains unlawful 1 y

i building

portion of

building with intent "" commit
•

Ann.

6-6-202.
^ -: - *- **:*i 1 a w f u 1 I

when t h e premises

in in i

i
n

i em i se s

-ortion thereof at tl: le time or the entry

13

or remaining are not open to the public and when the actor is not
otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises
or such portion thereof."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(3) (1995).

Consequently, defendant may prevail here only if the evidence
is so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that he was "licensed or
privileged to enter" units 98 and 99 on 14 January 1996. Ortiz,
782 P.2d at 962 (citation omitted).
A.

Defendant' 3 failure to acknowledge or satisfy his "heavy
burden" to marshal the evidence defeats this claim.

Despite claiming to summarize the evidence on which "the jury
found Mr. Hawkins guilty of burglary," Br. Aplt. at 12, defendant's
brief minimizes or ignores evidence supporting the jury's conclusion
that defendant's 4 a.m. entry was unauthorized, including the
following facts:
•

defendant's arrangement with Tim Markham was month-to-month
and defendant paid no rent for December 1995 or January
1996 (R. 300: 158, 198-200; R. 301: 198);

•

after October 1995 defendant "just disappeared for two or
three months and never came back for anything" (R. 300:
108, 139, 158, 170, 205; R. 301: 10);

• according to Tim Markham, defendant "evicted himself by
not showing" (R. 300: 170);
• "because [defendant] was gone," and in keeping with his
policy of " [n] o pay, no stay, " Tim Markham changed his locks
on the units (R. 300: 139, 171; £f. R. 300: 139-40);
•

after defendant left, Tim Markham leased unit 98 to a third
party (R. 300: 144, 184);

14

-xin Severns was shocked to see defendant in the early
morning hours of 14 January 1996 because he had not seen
him around the units for a long time (~ ™ " . ] 2, 4 2 ) ;
• ai unac time, defendant asked Severns wl ldt ^^ ->s ,1 there, a question that Severns found unusual (R. 301:
•

defendant admitted at trial that he entered both units on
the night of 13-14 January 1996 and "did what I had to do"
(E 301 : 169-7] , 3 98);
wlien Gloria Markham called defendant's partner seeking a
return of the tools defendant stole, he stated, "Yes, we
know about this, and we might know where they are, and there
was a family member that had hocked them" (R. 300: 78, 97) .

• defendant lied to the investigating officer, denying the
encounter with Severns and claiming, "They're all liars,
and that wasn't me" (R. 300: 222; State's exhibit 19 second
page 1; see also R 30] • 206 209-10).
Because

Iefendant has failed to fulfil or even acknowledge his

obligatioi1 to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict,
this Court should decline to reach the merits of this claim.

See

Pilling, 8 ; 5 IE 2- i • 1 1: 608
B.

In any event, the record refutes defendant's claim
that he was authorized to break into the units.

Defendant's claim fails on the merits i n any event.
Abandoned lease. Contrary to defendant' s assertions on appeal,
Br. Aplt. a

18-22, no lease entitled him to enter the premises on

January lU'Jb.
Defendant acknowledges that Tim Markham's agreement with him
was
And he admitted at tria. *.r.at tie paid
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for December

1995 or January

1996

(R. 300: 158, 198-200).

Consequently, as defendant understood would be the case, Tim Markham
changed the locks and rented the space to a paying tenant (R. 300:
139, 144, 171, 184).
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, when confronted
by police after the break-in, defendant did not claim that his entry
was authorized by Tim Markham's oral, month-to-month lease; instead
he lied and denied he was even present that night (R. 300: 222;
State's exhibit 19 second page 1; see also R. 301: 206, 209-10).
Finally, although defendant testified at trial, he never claimed
to have entered the premises pursuant to a lease (see R. 301: 168-76) .
From these facts, among others, reasonable jurors could have
concluded that, whatever license defendant and the Markhams understood
him to hold prior to January 1996, by that date he had no leasehold
right to enter the premises.
The Markhams' "open invitation." Similarly, defendant's claim
on appeal that he was granted an unrestricted "open invitation" to
enter the units, see Br. Aplt. at 24, puts too wishful a spin on
the facts.

Defendant stopped using the space and stopped paying

for it, but left his property on the premises; accordingly, Tim
Markham changed the locks, re-rented the space, and, along with Gloria
and Jim Severns, demanded that defendant remove his property (R.
300: 108-09, 139, 158, 171; 198-200, 205; R. 301: 10, 19-20).
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Jurors could reasonably conclude that when someone says/"Come

to the building at all hours," as defendant now claims.

. Aplt.

intended and were understood to have intended • )r defendant to come
"liiriin "| business hours and remove his property *inaer their supervision.
And while defendant is technically correct that the record does not
establish that the Markhams ever "told Mr. Hawkins he was no longer
we 1 c ome " o r f o rma 11

; * ct ed

1 i :i m,, B :i : 1 \ i; 3 t:

at 9

t: 1 e i: e c a i I I: • =

doubt, based on the trial record, that everyone understood that

Moreover, defendant never, even in his trial testimony, claimed
::: ]:: = -x i :i i: I , ::i !
::: a !:::l ::: i: i' ""' (

:::

222; State's exhibit 19 second page 1; IB; 30] 168- 76; see also R.
301: 206, 209-11 0) .
On appeal, defendant relies in part on his allegation, without
citation to the record, that "ft]he Markhams had given Mr. Hawkins

indicates that Jim Severns
pull

II,

Il ni i ! I ni i UP f e n fill i ni ni ni I

unit 98 (R 300: 139-40;
key

c\. J U X

the

~v t~ = ••** l

the Markhams, gave defendan*
ippa rpii I ly

163-64

p i a r p i ||

Mn

i| |

11 , j , |

|

|

Severns kept the other

Jurors could reasonably conclude that keeping
* ung on t** s.uc Uww*. to your O~JL ^ ~ ^

^^^

not entitle you to re-enter the premises in the middle of the night.
17
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In any event, by 14 January 1996 defendant had apparently lost
or forgotten his key, because he entered unit 98 by kicking in the
door (see R. 301: 15).
Defendant's claim that Tim Markham ratified his "open and
notorious entry into unit 99," Br. Aplt. at 22, is equally
unsupportable. No testimony established that defendant entered the
premises after October 1995 with the Markhams' knowledge. On the
contrary, Jim Severns and Tim Markham both testified that defendant
had not been in the units after the end of October until the night
of the crime (see R. 300: 139, 149, R. 301: 52-53).
Unlawful remaining. Finally, defendant asserts, "If there is
no unlawful entry, the State must show an unlawful remaining in order
to sustain a burglary charge." Br. Aplt. at 24. The State agrees.
However, since the State established at trial that defendant entered
the premises unlawfully, it had no duty or reason to prove that
defendant also remained on the premises unlawfully. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995).

Accordingly, the State will not respond

to defendant's appellate discussion of unlawful remaining. See Br.
Aplt. at 24-29.
POINT II
REASONABLE MINDS COULD INFER DEFENDANT7 S CRIMINAL INTENT
FROM THE FACT THAT HE ENTERED THE PREMISES AT 4 A.M.,
REMOVED PROPERTY NOT BELONGING TO HIM, AND LIED TO POLICE
Defendant claims that "the State failed to offer sufficient
evidence to show Mr. Hawkins possessed the criminal intent necessary
18

I

suppo? !

burgl ary conviction.

ox.

~. at 29 (boldface and

capitalization r e m o v e d ) .
A.

Defendant' s failure to acknowledge or satisfy his "heavy
b u r d e n " to m a r s h a l the evidence defeats this claim.
acknowledge or

satisfy the m a r s h a l i n g requiremen

Rather, he "only cites the

pvirtencfi favorable i" n hi' *Laims and reargues the evidence as I f
at t r i a l . " Brown 840 P.2d at 149. l e e B r

i! j •] "

.1 3 1 32

Si I >

an approach is inappropriate on a p p e a l . "

Brown 840 P.2d at 149.

This claim theretore *.~*-.s.
_.

li. a n y event, * ^
that h e lacked

- tfv.

-- :ord refutes defendant "" s claim
a,] intent
UI1

(.jie m e r i t s "
a

is guilty of burglary ±i ne enters

-ytf event.

M

A person

.xxJinq or any portion

of a building with inter1" *-^ rnmrnir
Ann

*

Code

-

rarely susceptible of direct proof.
c i r c u m s t H i 11 i i I i» I i I H I n »

| I I I In

Is usually inferred from

in i i i i n i

i' I " iM i , ,

I ' I I In

I im

I

day, [3] the character and contents of the building, I «ll the person's
a

cue

circumstances, and
705

D

2d

?4

totalit

I

-he intruder's explanation.

I h

surrounding

State v. Porter,

(Utah 1 9 8 5 ) .
I m il i b i n I I

Viewing evidence nl I lie tuxeyoiiiy bin

Il in ill ill n n i I

favorable to the jury's verdict demonstrates that the evidence was
sufficient l'"i r east iidble | i "

"

'

'

'

' "H

_ •'

Manner and time of entry, Contrary to defendant's various
explanations, evidence at trial indicated that defendant gained access
to the units by kicking in or bending the overhead door (R. 300:
72, 145, 149; R. 301: 15). 10
around 4 a.m.

Defendant admits he entered the units

See Br. Aplt. at 32.

Forcible entry during nighttime supports an inference that a
defendant acted "with an intent to commit theft." State v. Brooks,
631 P.2d 878, 882 (Utah 1981); accord State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d
856, 859 (Utah 1981) ("When one breaks and enters a building in the
night-time, without consent, an inference may be drawn that he did
so to commit larceny").
Character and contents of the building. Stolen from the units
were items belonging to defendant together with tools owned by Tim
Markham and a third party (R. 300: 128-29, 146-50, 172, 184; R. 301:
17, 40-41, 51; State's exhibits 3, 4) . The stolen tools were basically
what one would need to be in the auto-body business (R. 300: 152) .
Defendant's goal was to own an auto-body shop (R. 301: 177-78).
This factor supports an inference of criminal intent.
Defendant's actions after entry.

After entering the units,

defendant removed all of his portable property and removed or attempted
to remove other tools (R. 300: 73-74, 128-29, 146-51, 184; R. 301:

10

At trial defendant claimed to have let himself in u[w]ith
my padlock key" (R. 301: 169). His brief surmises that defendant
"presumably gained access to the units by rolling under the
broken roll-up garage door." Br. Aplt. at 31.
20

17, 40-41,, 51 ; State's e x h i b i t s 3

1)

c i iiiini i I M-M1 t i infill

Il mi I i I ni i (11

11 i I ni I 11 ni I I 1111J ni In

O b v i o u s l y , that defendant
-nippo r f

an

inference

that he entered the premises with the intern vu commit theft.
Intruder's explanation.

Defendant's post-crime explanations

varied. He lied to police and claimed that Severns had seen someone
else at: the crime location uu L H C m.

estion

State's exhibit 1 9 second page 1; see also
At trial defendant admitted that he entered both units on. the night
in questIc i i ai i< ::i

::ii • ::i

1 : .c I: I 1: l

I .

Inconsistent o r false e x p l a n a t i o n s a r e incriminating. See State
State J . uellatl r , 'I "I \

v. Smith
P . 2 d 9 9 3 , 9 9 5 n ,' (III ill I l *h'M .
Totality -if "i in i" i II Ii

reamstances. In addition to.the facts

cited above, the following facts are among those that tend to
incriminate defendant: he was acting nervous and unusual when Severns
confronted him at the scene of the crime; defendant's partner stated
afterwards that Mwe mi ght know where [the missing tools] are"; and
valuable items for wl lich jeienuu.
burglary.
I I in

See pp. 6-9 herein.

I ni mi ni II

II 111- i n i <

" Ii

Ill II I I I I

II i i |il ill

I HI i I

I II i / n r a b l f

I ii I\w

jury's verdict, contains abundant evidence of defendant's intcin
to commit theft.

L

CONCLUSION
Defendant's burglary conviction should be affirmed.11
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Defendant does not challenge his conviction for theft.
See Br. Aplt. at 34.
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Addendum A

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

76-6-201.

Definitions.

For the purposes of
this part:
(1) "Building,n in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted
for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business
therein and includes:
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or
vehicle; and
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure
or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person
lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when,
the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining
are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or
privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof
(4) "Enter* means:
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.

76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of ourgiary it he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.

